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Recently planners, activists, and residents have begun asking if 
foreclosures have an effect on crime rates. The existence of such an 
effect could provide strategic guidance to community developers 
and organizers who are grappling with the ills of foreclosure and 
crime. Many community development corporations (CDCs) focus 
their limited resources on housing development instead of other 
tasks like CDCs, which has sparked debate about the proper roles 
of community development and organizing groups. The question 
is if there is a link between foreclosures and crime that should 








term intervention worthwhile. Foreclosure is a 
socioeconomic condition that leads to physical 
abandonment, crime can have dramatic effects 
on people’s physical and mental well-being. 
Many urban neighborhoods are currently facing 
high rates of both. CDCs need to understand 
these conditions and their relationships in 
order to effectively serve their communities. 
In general, because of the unproven causal 
the effects of foreclosure on crime rates, CDCs 
currently pursuing a housing development-
centric mission should not dramatically 
overhaul their operations. Rather, such CDCs 
should think about ways in which they can 
improve neighborhood safety through physical 
housing development while also supporting 
longer-term organizing efforts aimed at larger 
structural issues of justice and equity.
What is a Community Development 
Corporation? 
Beginning in the 1960s, community activists 
and stakeholders began forming CDCs with the 
goals of revitalizing low-income communities, 
promoting economic enterprise, and asserting 
more local control over development (Vidal, 
1996). They were often founded with an 
explicit focus serving on communities of 
color and promoting more socially just living 
conditions, neighborhoods, and development 
processes (Vidal, 1996). Many CDCs grew  out of 
neighborhood organizing and protests against 
urban renewal development that threatened 
to gut low-income communities, usually 
of color (Vidal, 1996). By the 1980s, though, 
significant declines in federal funding for 
these organizations, coupled with an increase 
in the availability of funding from corporate 
and philanthropic sources, led new CDCS to 
shift their focus towards housing issues (Vidal, 
1996). There are concerns that CDCs cannot 
effectively fight against economic disadvantage 
and political marginalization while relying 
on funding from organizations–corporations, 
foundations, even government–that frequently 
build and perpetuate those very conditions 
(Bratt, 1997). While many CDCs today continue 
to focus on community building and organizing, 
the vast majority are involved in creating 
affordable housing with small staffs, limited 
financial resources, and in an environment that 
promotes competition rather than cooperation 
between organizations (Vidal, 1996).
Given the necessary financial resources, 
technical knowledge, and organizational 
capacity, CDCs in areas with high foreclosure 
rates can and do acquire foreclosed homes and 
redevelop them in an attempt at neighborhood 
A s foreclosures mount in neighborhoods across the country and homes stand vacant and often abandoned, city 
planners, activists, and residents have begun 
asking if these foreclosures have an effect on 
crime rates that demands attention (Jaffe, 2012). 
The existence of such an effect could provide 
strategic guidance to community developers 
and organizers who are grappling with the 
ills of foreclosure and crime. Since the 1960s, 
many community development corporations 
(CDCs) have focused their limited resources on 
housing development instead of other tasks 
like community organizing and economic 
development (Stoecker, 1997; Bratt, 1997, 
Keating, 1997).  The idea of moving beyond 
housing  has sparked debate regarding the 
critical role of community development and 
organizing groups (Krumholz, 2012). This is not 
to imply that CDCs are myopically focused on 
housing development and unconcerned with 
neighborhood safety, because the two have 
deeply intertwined root causes and spur similar 
strategic actions. Instead, this paper looks at 
the  possible link between foreclosures and 
crime and considers whether or not explicitly 
attempting to prevent foreclosures through 
strategies aimed at underlying social, economic, 
and political conditions could have a measurable 
effect on the common goal of promoting safer, 
healthier communities. This paper explores 
the traditional roles of CDCs and the invisible 
link between housing foreclosures and 
crime. Despite the lack of definitive evidence 
to support this link, the paper argues that 
CDCs can and should begin to gradually and 
strategically shift their priorities and reallocate 
their resources to address underlying social, 
economic, and political conditions. Finally, 
using the Grandmont Rosdale Development 
Corporate as a case study, the paper provides 
recommendations for CDCs looking to make the 
shift.
Although relevant literature does not definitively 
demonstrate that foreclosures have a causal 
relationship with crime, there is nevertheless 
considerable evidence of at least some modest 
relationship that makes both short- and long-
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Grandmont Rosedale, Detroit 
and the Grandmont Rosedale 
Development Corporation
The Grandmont Rosedale communities in 
Northwest Detroit are relatively stable but still in 
danger of transition due to the foreclosure crisis. 
According to a neighborhood profile compiled 
in 2012 by Data Driven Detroit, from 2000 to 
2010, they experienced a 7.9% drop in occupied 
housing units but suffered less than the rest 
of Detroit, which saw a 19.9% decrease. 83% of 
homes in 2010 were owner-occupied, down 
from 90% in 2000, but this rate outpaces Detroit 
as a whole, where only 51.1% of units are owner-
occupied. The condition of the housing stock 
is generally significantly better than that of the 
city as a whole, made up almost exclusively of 
single-family detached dwellings. Violent crime, 
property crime, drug offenses, and vandalism 
are all increasingly important issues, but the 
rates of their incidence in Grandmont Rosedale 
are significantly below those of the city as whole 
(Data Driven Detroit, 2012).
The neighborhood is served by the Grandmont 
Rosedale Development Corporation (GRDC), a 
CDC that focuses, among other things, on both 
vacant home renovations and neighborhood 
safety. Now in its 25th year, GRDC has 
renovated and sold 85 formerly vacant homes, 
constructed and sold three new housing units, 
and is currently rehabbing another 11 homes 
(Tom Goddeeris, personal communication, 
February 14, 2014). In addition, GRDC has 
provided financial assistance to 140 low-income 
homeowners for home repairs and renovations 
and operates a vacant property maintenance 
task force (See Figure1). GRDC also operates 
a community safety task forces made up of 
neighbors and staff, who coordinate efforts 
to reduce crime. GRDC is a model for the 
CDC this paper envisions as the target of its 
recommendations–a CDC that operates housing 
development and community safety initiatives 
in the service of neighborhood stabilization, but 
does not explicitly concentrate on foreclosure 
prevention as a community safety tool.
Research on Foreclosure and Crime
A review of the existing research does not 
provide a definitive answer to whether or not 
there is a link between foreclosure and crime, 
and is murkier still on the question of causality. 
Studies have been conducted in different cities 
using different variables, models, and data. 
Some studies found a link between foreclosure 
stabilization and blight reduction, without 
any specific intent to combat crime. If the 
link between foreclosures and crime is strong 
enough, however, CDCs must consider a 
preventative approach that shifts some limited 
resources from housing development to also 
strike at the roots of the foreclosure crisis–for 
example, by providing foreclosure counseling, 
lobbying for fairer lending practices, promoting 
job creation, or organizing community power 
to stand up to banks. If foreclosures and crime 
are linked, CDCs should develop neighborhood 
stabilization strategies that attempt to prevent 
foreclosures in addition to remedying their 
effects. Such efforts may take on more overt 
elements of community organizing and 
economic justice, if the CDCs are not already 
engaged in such practices. 
Although this paper necessarily makes 
generalizations about the missions and functions 
of CDCs,  I recognize that there is great variation 
across organizations and regions in how they 
operate. The research and recommendations 
that follow are geared towards a hypothetical 
CDC that concentrates its resources on housing 
development and vacant structure rehabilitation 
in the interest of stabilizing and improving the 
neighborhoods it serves. In this case, the CDC 
does not explicitly treat foreclosure prevention 
as a strategy for promoting safety and stability.
These recommendations will also have varying 
degrees of efficacy across neighborhoods 
facing different foreclosure conditions. A single 
CDC operating in a neighborhood with high 
foreclosure and crime rates will have less ability 
to influence neighborhood safety conditions 
with its policies than a CDC operating in an 
area with only moderate crime and a more 
manageable number of foreclosures. The 
analysis and recommendations that follow are 
targeted at CDCs operating in neighborhoods 
where the foreclosure rate, while perhaps not 
necessarily “manageable,” is such that a single 
CDC could reasonably have a meaningful 
effect on neighborhood stability and safety 
through its policies. That is not to imply that 
high-crime, high-foreclosure neighborhoods 
should be subject to triage, but rather that such 
an intervention may require a degree of human 
capital, political support, and financial resources 
that is beyond the capacity of a single CDC. 
113
AGORA 8
blockface, but the effect was smaller than that 
for a foreclosure on the same blockface (p. 67). 
The effects of foreclosure on total crime were 
also larger in police precincts with moderate 
and high levels of crime (p. 67). In general, 
researchers have been unable to definitively 
determine causality–elevated crime might 
trigger defaults by lowering property values 
or localized distress might be causing both 
foreclosures and crime (p. 61).
A number of other researchers have found some 
link between increased foreclosure activity 
and increased crime rates. Teasdale, Clark, and 
Hinkle found that across a variety of crime 
types, foreclosures had significant and positive 
effects on crime in Akron, Ohio census tracts 
(Teasdale et al., 2012). For every foreclosure they 
found a 2-3% increase in crime–that is, a typical 
Census tract experienced 40% more crime than 
it would have in the absence of foreclosure (p. 
174). Cui found that on average in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, violent crime within 250 feet of 
foreclosed homes increased by more than 15% 
once the foreclosed home became vacant, while 
the initiation of foreclosure proceedings itself 
had no effect (Cui, 2010, p. 23). These effects 
were similar but less precise for property crime, 
indicating that the impact of foreclosures may 
and total crime (Ellen, Lacoe, and Sharygin, 
2013; Teasdale, Clark, and Hinkle, 2012; Stucky, 
Ottensmann, and Payton, 2012), some found a 
link with violent crime only (Immergluck and 
Smith, 2006; Cui, 2010), some found little to no 
link at all (Katz, Wallace, and Hedberg, 2013; 
Kirk and Hyra, 2012), and one found that results 
should vary between different cities (Baumer, 
Wolff, and Arnio, 2012). Possible explanations 
for such a link include the way in which vacant 
buildings lend themselves to criminal activity, 
the way foreclosures send signals to criminals, 
and the way physical and social disorder erode 
social control in neighborhoods. 
Dan Immergluck and Geoff Smith first 
examined the potential link between 
foreclosures and crime in a 2006 study in 
Chicago. Controlling for demographic and 
neighborhood factors, they found that the 
foreclosure rate was a statistically significant 
determinant of violent crime, but not property 
crime (Immergluck and Smith, 2006, p. 862). 
An increase in the foreclosure rate of one per 
100 owner-occupied properties yielded a 2.33% 
increase in violent crime, with a full standard 
deviation increase in the foreclosure rate of 
2.88 per 100, yielding an increase of 6.7% (p. 
862). While the effect on property crime was 
not statistically significant, the relationship was 
positive, which they surmised might be due to 
unreported property crimes on vacant properties 
and under-reported property crimes in low-
income areas (p. 863).
Ellen, Lacoe, and Sharygin compared changes 
in crime levels on blockfaces in New York City 
experiencing an increase in foreclosure activity 
to changes in crime levels on blockfaces that 
were not experiencing increased foreclosures 
located in the same census tract (Ellen et al., 
2013, p. 62). They studied the effects of both 
active foreclosures and properties headed to 
the foreclosure auction. They found that one 
additional active foreclosure was associated with 
a 0.7% increase in total crime, a 1.4% increase 
in violent crime, and a 0.7% increase in public 
order crimes on a blockface (p. 65). An additional 
property headed to auction was associated with 
a 1.4% increase in total crime, a 2.6% increase 
in violent crimes, and a 2.6% increase in public 
order crimes (p. 65). 
These results contained some important 
qualifications. Foreclosure activity appeared 
linked to subsequent crime only when there 
had been three or more foreclosure notices 
issued on a blockface (p. 68). A foreclosure on 
an adjacent blockface was observed to have a 
significant, positive association with crime on a 
Fig.9.1 and 9.2: 
Before and After Repair 
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different cities (p. 593). For robberies, they found 
that foreclosure and crime were more strongly 
related in cities with low overall foreclosure rates 
and relatively high socioeconomic disadvantage 
(p. 593). They found a stronger association 
between foreclosure and burglary, especially in 
cities with aging housing stock and shrinking 
police forces (p. 593). Their key contribution was 
that it is misleading to draw strong conclusions 
about the effects of foreclosures on crime from 
a single city, and that the broader city context 
appears to influence the strength of the link.
Possible Effects of Foreclosures on 
Crime Rates
As demonstrated above, no research has 
definitively confirmed that increased   
foreclosures have a positive effect on crime 
rates, or that foreclosures cause increases 
in crime. However, many researchers have 
observed relationships between additional 
foreclosures and increased crime, and the most 
prevalent hypotheses on these relationships are 
useful for community developers and organizers 
grappling with neighborhood change and 
stabilization efforts.
A common consequence of foreclosure is 
that a property becomes vacant. Such vacant 
property is theorized to facilitate crime, where 
squatting, drug activity, and prostitution may 
find a natural shelter (Spelman, 1993). Vacant 
buildings themselves become targets for 
property crime, like scrapping. Furthermore, 
the physical deterioration that accompanies a 
foreclosure may signal to potential criminals 
that residents are less invested in the block, 
which can embolden criminals (Harcourt and 
Ludwig, 2006). The longer a property sits vacant, 
therefore, the more opportunity it presents 
for criminal activity. Indeed, this notion was 
supported by some of the studies detailed above 
(e.g., Ellen et al., 2013, Cui, 2010).
Routine criminal activity theory provides 
another possible explanation for how 
foreclosures affect crime. Foreclosures 
potentially change the costs and benefits of 
committing a crime by affecting the number 
of suitable targets and changing the number 
of perceived “capable guardians”–monitors of 
public spaces in neighborhoods–against crime 
(Ellen et al., 2013, p. 61). Criminals see physical 
deterioration and vacancy and calculate that 
there are not only fewer people on the block, 
but also that the remaining people may not 
have their eyes on the street. Foreclosures 
also reduce the number of “capable guardians” 
as households in homes going through the 
depend on the stage of the foreclosure process 
(p. 23). Katz, Wallace, and Hedberg studied 
foreclosures in Glendale, Arizona and found 
that they had modest short-term effects on 
crime rates (Katz et al., 2013). They observed 
that in the first month following an increase in 
foreclosure, crime increased, but in subsequent 
months crime decreased and stabilized (p. 
380). Stucky, Ottensmann, and Payton studied 
Indianapolis and found that foreclosures were 
a statistically significant predictor of a wide 
range of crimes, including violent crime, but the 
effect was greater in neighborhoods with higher 
percentages of owner-occupied housing units 
and residential stability (Stucky et al., 2012).
In 2012 Kirk and Hyra pushed back against 
a growing body of research suggesting a 
connection between foreclosures and crime, 
positing that there were reasons to suspect 
that the relationships between foreclosure and 
crime was spurious, and that both were a result 
of deeper structural issues (Kirk and Hyra, 
2012). Looking at large neighborhood areas in 
Chicago after the subprime mortgage meltdown, 
they concluded that rising foreclosures did not 
coincide with any measurable increase in crime, 
even in areas with concentrated foreclosures (p. 
665). They concluded that residential instability, 
community disadvantage, and the relative 
political influence of a community are much 
more important predictors of crime (p. 664). 
Kirk and Hyra argue that historic disinvestment 
in minority urban communities–communities 
particularly hard hit by the foreclosure crisis–
fundamentally shapes the internal community 
conditions that influence the prevalence of 
crime (p. 654). Furthermore, they argue that 
the political influence of a community is an 
important determinant of the ability to secure 
public goods like police patrols, and after they 
controlled for historic disadvantage and political 
influence, the effect of foreclosures on crime 
was nil (p. 661). Kirk and Hyra strongly advocate 
looking beyond what they see as a surface-level 
connection between foreclosure and crime to 
address deeper structural issues of economic 
justice that shape urban communities.
In a study that they hoped would make sense 
of the myriad conclusions of researchers before 
them, Baumer, Wolff, and Arnio (2012) examined 
post-meltdown foreclosures and burglaries and 
robberies in subsequent years across 50 different 
U.S. cities. Like Kirk and Hyra, they found no 
significant association between neighborhood 
foreclosures and robbery when controlling for 
neighborhood conditions on a national level, 
but noted that their findings indicated that 
there was great variability in this result across 
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becomes vacant, CDCs and neighborhood 
groups can perform basic maintenance to guard 
against inviting vandalism, arson, and other 
criminal behavior. GRDC, for its part, operates a 
task force of concerned neighbors that monitors 
foreclosures, maintains the appearance of 
occupancy by planting flowers and mowing 
lawns, and boards up vacant homes. CDCs 
should endeavor to purchase as many foreclosed 
properties in their neighborhoods as possible to 
avoid the unfortunate result that a speculator 
purchases the property and sits on it or the 
property reverts back to the government, which 
then fails to maintain it. Pursuing a policy 
of purchasing foreclosed homes for resale is 
limited, obviously, by the amount of funding 
CDCs secure, and this is just one piece of what 
effective organizations must take on. CDCs 
can work with local governments to establish, 
revamp, or consolidate land banks that have 
the capacity to absorb foreclosures and put the 
structures and land to productive use. CDCs can 
also work with local governments to identify 
structures that require demolition and to work to 
align neighborhood and city priorities.
Just as clustered investment can benefit 
a neighborhood, studies show that higher 
concentrations of foreclosure reveal links to 
crime. Ellen et al. specifically suggest that 
foreclosures are linked to criminal activity only 
when three or more foreclosures have occurred 
on a block, and that those crime rate effects 
are most significant on that block itself, rather 
than on adjacent blocks (Schuetz, Been, Ellen, 
2008; Ellen et al., 2013, p. 59). CDCs should 
comprehensively track foreclosures in their 
neighborhoods and monitor these thresholds in 
order to better target limited resources. Perhaps 
a CDC has only enough capital to purchase 
and renovate two foreclosed homes–targeting 
that capital so that one block remains vacancy 
free might be preferable to purchasing two 
foreclosures on a block with ten. GRDC, for 
its part, monitors foreclosures in Grandmont 
Rosedale closely in large part to make more 
forceful appeals to funding. sources about the 
importance of shoring up housing stock and 
avoiding neighborhood decline tipping points.
In addition to these physical interventions, 
CDCs should encourage the formation of 
block clubs and neighborhood associations 
that promote social interaction and a sense 
of investment in the community. Such 
organizations steel the resolve of residents 
in the face of decline. Promoting a sense of 
community and putting more eyes on the street 
may help guard against disorganization and 
create new “capable guardians” where others 
foreclosure process may withdraw socially 
from the neighborhood, either due to stress, 
embarrassment, or a diminished sense of 
territoriality that accompanies a potential move 
out (Ellen et al., 2013, p. 61). This translates not 
only to more opportunity for property crime, 
but also to shelters for activities like drug and 
alcohol abuse that are related to violent crime 
(Baumer et al., 2012, p. 580). This notion is 
supported by the research detailed above.
Disorganization theory also helps explain how 
foreclosures may result in increased crime. 
Vacant and abandoned buildings can be 
considered a component of the physical disorder 
of a neighborhood, which can undermine the 
ways in which communities keep social control 
(Skogan, 1990). The theory argues that physical 
disorder encourages residents to withdraw from 
public social interactions and social control 
efforts–creating social disorder–which results 
in unguarded areas in neighborhoods where 
crime can more freely take place (Baumer et 
al., 2012, p. 579). In addition, as conditions 
deteriorate and residents move out, remaining 
residents lose some of their ability to recognize 
outsiders and informal social controls lose their 
efficacy (Katz et al., 2013, 363). Physical and 
social disorganization are thought to reduce 
the availability of informal social control 
mechanisms, which limits a community’s ability 
to address the crime problems associated with 
foreclosure (Taylor, 2009).
Room for Intervention
While the link debate continues overhead, 
the key questions for CDCs and community 
organizers on the ground are what opportunities 
for short- and long-term interventions exist, 
where do they exist, and who will facilitate 
them? In general, CDCs currently pursuing a 
housing development-centric mission should 
think about ways in which they can improve 
neighborhood safety through physical housing 
development interventions while supporting 
longer-term organizing efforts aimed at larger 
structural issues of justice and equity.
There can be little doubt that vacant structures 
are bad for communities, and CDCs and 
community groups can attack this problem 
in a number of ways (Ellen et al., 2013, Cui, 
2010, Immergluck and Smith, 2006). Loan 
modifications can help keep people in their 
homes and prevent a vacancy (Cui, 2010). GRDC, 
for example, takes the financing issue a step 
further. It provides down-payment assistance 
to homebuyers purchasing its renovated homes 
and works with a community-based lender 
to provide fairer finance terms. If a property 
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have disappeared. CDCs can provide technical 
support to such groups, even if it is simply in the 
form of meeting space or printing capabilities. 
GRDC is largely meeting this challenge and is 
a critical institution in its community. GRDC 
operates a neighborhood farmers’ market and 
community garden, organizes community 
beautification projects, works closely with the 
neighborhood associations that organize block 
clubs, and gives access to its office space to 
community groups.
Rather than totally abandoning the notion of 
community organizing, as Stoecker (1997, p. 11) 
advocates, CDCs should align their development 
policies in ways that support extant and ongoing 
organizing efforts, and should lend resources 
and expertise to these organizing groups 
where possible. CDCs should allow community 
organizing groups to take the lead on initiatives 
and think critically about the extent to which 
they are–and by extension, their outside capital 
is–driving decision-making. This is necessary 
to avoid what Stoecker worries could amount 
to a disorganization of the community via 
the demands outside capital places on CDCs 
(Stoecker, 1997, p. 12). 
While foreclosure and crime can never truly 
be ameliorated without a concerted effort to 
address structural issues of economic justice 
and marginalization, a community-driven 
planning process with a long-term focus, as 
Stoecker envisions, appears feasible (Stoecker, 
1997, p. 14). Building a sense of community 
and enhancing political power while linking 
immediate concerns about foreclosure and 
crime to long-term goals of justice and equity 
is wholly desirable. Stoecker’s insistence that 
CDCs stay away from organizing efforts and 
focus on housing development seems to rest 
on overstated, generalized fears that the people 
running CDCs are either ignorant about their 
relation to capital, uninterested in economic 
justice, or otherwise lack the capacity to deal 
with issues of power and influence.  Given the 
housing landscape and the destabilization of 
many urban neighborhoods, CDCs should focus 
primarily on physical development. However, 
there is significant room for them to participate 
in long-term, justice-oriented organizing that 
should not be ignored at the risk of turning 
away valuable technical, financial, and human 
resources.  A community-driven organizing 
process that decides establishing a land bank is 
a good way to promote affordable housing and 
remove speculators from the community could 
benefit tremendously from a CDCs knowledge 
of how land banking works, its technical ability 
to raise funds for property acquisition, and 
its capacity to connect organizers with the 
necessary lawyers and government officials to 
bring such a plan to fruition.
CDCs can also capitalize on their political 
connections to local government and 
stakeholders to advocate for policing reforms in 
their areas. Community policing has shown great 
promise in reducing property crimes, as police 
and residents foster greater communication 
and trust, and CDCs could advocate for tactical 
reforms in their neighborhoods (Anderson, 2013). 
In addition, CDCs and neighborhood groups can 
marshall resources and resident involvement 
to provide security services that augment city 
protections, e.g. radio patrols or private security 
contractors. GRDC is, in this arena too, making 
strides to use its political clout to improve 
neighborhood safety. The neighborhoods were 
selected for a community policing pilot project, 
and GRDC is leading a charge to create a special 
assessment district that would allow residents 
to pay an extra tax to support an increased 
police presence. All of these strategies are 
feasible steps that CDCs can take in concert 
with neighborhood groups to critically address 
the potential effects of foreclosures on crime 
while not waylaying a CDC’s mission of housing 
development.
Discussion and Conclusions
The research points to a possible context-
specific connection between foreclosure and 
certain kinds of crime, but causation is difficult 
to pinpoint, and the strength of the evidence 
does not compel CDCs to overhaul their 
operations in a dramatic fashion. However, this 
does not imply that CDCs cannot also pair their 
physical development aims with community-
organizing efforts that promote equity and 
justice to more comprehensively address 
foreclosure and crime in their neighborhoods–
on the contrary, they should. I do not necessarily 
suggest that CDCs take on community 
organizing actions that jeopardize their funding 
sources or access to power. Part of what makes 
many CDCs valuable to the neighborhoods they 
operate in is precisely their access to capital and 
local decision-makers, and precisely that they 
are providing needed housing options where 
traditional developers would not build. But 
such a reality should force a reassessment of 
the mission and strategy of the organization, to 
ensure that if a CDC is committed to improving 
neighborhood safety in addition to housing 
development, that it align itself with partners in 
the community that allow it to serve this larger 




capacity of community groups dedicated to 
monitoring vacancy and promoting safety, 
work with lenders for fairer financing terms 
and loan modifications, lobby politically for 
resources, and maintains a vigilant focus on 
whether or not their actions are supporting 
broader efforts to make structural, socially just 
change. By focusing on physical development 
while critically engaging in community-driven 
organizing processes, CDCs can open multiple 
fronts in the campaign to secure the future of 
their neighborhoods.
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Foreclosures appear to be most damaging to 
community security in that they often result in 
vacant buildings that harbor crime and destroy 
the social networks keeping neighborhoods safe. 
CDCs can utilize their physical development 
strengths to ameliorate the problems of 
vacancyby encouraging aesthetic and functional 
improvements that maintain an appearance of 
occupancy, purchasing foreclosed and vacant 
homes to keep ownership local, promoting 
land banks, and monitoring thresholds and 
targeting resources geographically. Furthermore, 
CDCs can support the creation and technical 
